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Abstract—Disruption-free updates are a key primitive to ef-
fectively operate SDN networks and maximize the benefits of
their programmability. In this paper, we study how to implement
this primitive safely (with respect to forwarding correctness and
policies), efficiently (in terms of consumed network resources) and
robustly to unpredictable factors like delayed message delivery
and processing. First, we analyze the fundamental limitations
of prior proposals, which either (i) progressively replace initial
flow rules with new ones, or (ii) instruct switches to maintain
both initial and final rules. Second, we show that safe, efficient
and robust updates can be achieved by leveraging a more general
approach. We indeed unveil a dualism between rule replacements
and additions, that opens new degrees of freedom for supporting
SDN updates. Third, we demonstrate how to build upon this du-
alism. We propose FLIP, an algorithm that computes operational
sequences combining the efficiency of rule replacements with the
applicability of rule additions. FLIP identifies constraints on rule
replacements and additions that independently prevent safety
violations from occurring during the update. Then, it explores
the solution space by swapping constraints that prevent the same
safety violations, until it reaches a satisfiable set of constraints.
Fourth, we perform extensive simulations, showing that FLIP
can significantly outperform prior work: In the average case,
it guarantees a much higher success rate than algorithms only
based on rule replacements, and massively reduces the memory
overhead needed by techniques solely using rule additions.
I. INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
The single most important function of an SDN controller
is deciding how packets are forwarded through the network,
and program the switches accordingly. Updates are often
needed to adapt forwarding paths to network dynamics, e.g., to
better balance load, steer flows through virtualized functions
or implement new security policies. During an update, the
controller has to instruct switches to add, change and remove
some of the flow rules that they use to forward packets.
Ideally, the controller should carry out any update in a
safe, efficient and robust way. By safety we mean that service
disruptions should be avoided, hence both forwarding cor-
rectness (i.e., packet delivery) and policies (i.e., requirements
on forwarding paths) have to be preserved throughout the
update. In addition, the update should be efficient in terms of
consumed network resources (from bandwidth to switch mem-
ory). Finally, the update strategy should be robust to factors
unpredictable a-priori, like non-deterministic processing time
for switches to install or modify rules, or (indefinitely) delayed
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message delivery between the controller and the switches.
This robustness requirement rules out the naive approach of
pushing the final rules to all switches at the same time, as
well as strategies based on simultaneously applying operations
on several switches [23]. Rather, the controller must apply a
carefully-computed operational sequence, so that it can either
perform the next operation or roll back the previous one, at
any time, while provably preserving the update safety.
Despite the abundant literature on SDN updates (see [6] for
an overview), no proposed techniques supports safe, policy-
preserving updates, in an efficient and robust way.
• Many proposals focus on congestion avoidance [3], [7],
[9], [15] or forwarding correctness [17], [19], [32], but
do not support policy preservation at all.
• Some techniques [18], [20] support policies by computing
a specific order to replace initial rules with final ones. We
will refer to them as ordered replacement techniques.
They are efficient but their applicability is limited: An
order that guarantees both forwarding and policy preser-
vation may not exist [18], and it is computationally hard
to even decide if such an order exists [16].
• Finally, two-phase commit techniques [12], [24], [28] in-
struct network devices to temporarily store the initial and
final version of every rule that has to be updated. Either
initial or final rules are applied consistently network-
wide, depending on tags that are explicitly set on each
packet at the ingress (like in [12], [28]) or implic-
itly inferred by switches (e.g., on the basis of packet
timestamps [24]). While natively preserving forwarding
correctness and policies, this approach is inefficient, up
to the point of being impractical [12], [21].1
In particular, two-phase commit techniques inefficiently use
device memory, which is a precious resource, so important
that its consumption is regarded as one of the key factors
for scalable routing systems [36]. Device memory is a pri-
mary concern for current SDN networks, since commercial
SDN switches employ Ternary Content Addressable Memory
(TCAM) to support programmability [22]: TCAM is expen-
sive, power-hungry [14], and scarce [34]. We expect that
memory consumption keep being an important concern in the
future, e.g., considering that IPv6 requires more bytes per
flow than IPv4. Even more fundamentally, device memory is
a resource that must be shared among all packet-processing
network applications. Instead of reserving memory for network
updates, operators might therefore need to use that memory
to support the always growing number of offered services,
1Note that works like [10] building upon two-phase commit techniques (to
guarantee higher-level properties) also inherit this limitation.
2and to guarantee good network performance – for example,
supporting fine-grained (i) traffic engineering [11], (ii) security
and monitoring tasks [25], or (iii) fast failure recovery [27].
In this paper, we propose a model and an algorithm to
compute operational sequences that preserve forwarding cor-
rectness and policies, using additional rules only if necessary.
Our contributions are complementary to works that optimize
the implementation of rule replacement and additions (e.g., by
avoiding unnecessary updates of rule priorities [34]).
We unveil the dualism between rule replacements and
additions, showing that forwarding disruptions and policy vio-
lations can be prevented by either adding rules or constraining
the order of their replacement. This dualism allows us to
explore the solution space with new degrees of freedom.
We show that combining replacements and additions is more
powerful than restricting to either of the two, as all previous
techniques do. Such combinations, indeed, enable new ways
to guarantee the update safety, e.g., by admitting harmless
forwarding loops that packets traverse exactly once before
being successfully forwarded to their destination.
Unsurprisingly, this additional expressiveness comes at a
cost: It makes the problem of finding a safe update sequence
more challenging. Indeed, it significantly increases the search
space, since many more solutions are possible (all combina-
tions of rule replacements and additions). Moreover, it requires
a deeper understanding of the interactions between rule re-
placements and additions performed on different switches, e.g.,
distinguishing (at computation time) loops that are crossed
only once from those that disrupt connectivity.
We address those challenges with an original algorithm,
called FLIP. To compactly represent the search space, FLIP
formalizes possibilities to avoid safety violations as constraints
on rule replacements and additions. Moreover, it discovers
relationships between those constraints: It identifies sets of
constraints that are alternative to each other, as they are
capable of preventing the same forwarding disruption or the
same policy violation. For example, given a potential policy
violation, FLIP can determine that either constraints A and B
must be enforced for certain rule replacements, or constraint
C must hold for a given rule addition. FLIP then explores the
search space by swapping constraints with their alternatives,
until it ends up with a satisfiable set of constraints.
FLIP supports safe updates that cannot be carried out with
only rule replacements or solely rule additions. Moreover, it
greatly reduces the number of added rules in the average case.
When combining replacements and additions is not advan-
tageous for safety or efficiency, FLIP degenerates to either
ordered replacement or two-phase commit. This guarantees
that: (i) FLIP always computes a zero-overhead sequence, if
one exists (as ordered replacement); and (ii) FLIP always
finds a solution whenever any of the previous techniques is
applicable, e.g., if all network nodes have space to install
one additional rule (as two-phase commit). In those cases,
though, FLIP inherits the limits of the approach to which it
degenerates. For example, it induces the same overhead as
two-phase commit techniques if it is not safe to perform any
rule replacement; also, FLIP may not support some update
scenarios if rules cannot be added on any network node.
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Fig. 1. An update scenario with a policy to be preserved.
The rest of the paper describes the following contributions.
Analysis (§II). We detail how combining rule replacements
and additions opens new degrees of freedom in the policy-
preserving update problem. Also, we show how those combi-
nations enable us to overcome limitations of prior techniques.
Modeling (§III). We formalize the safe update problem when
operational sequences can include rule replacements and ad-
ditions. We also describe how FLIP models the solution space
in terms of constraints and relationships between them.
Algorithms (§IV-V). We walk through the execution of FLIP,
and detail its core procedures to extract constraints, identify
their relationships, and compute safe operational sequences.
Experimental evaluation (§VI). We evaluate our implemen-
tation of FLIP by simulating 50, 000 random update scenarios
for realistic networks: FLIP systematically outperforms previ-
ous techniques in terms of efficiency and success rate.
II. UNEXPLORED DEGREES OF FREEDOM
FOR SDN UPDATES
Fig. 1 shows a case where the SDN controller (not depicted
to help the reader focus on forwarding paths) has to update the
controlled network. For the sake of the example, the controller
has to modify the forwarding only for the flow f1 of packets
sourced at s and destined to d. Dashed and solid arrows
respectively represent the initial and final states, i.e., the paths
used before and after the update.
To perform the update, the controller can apply atomic
operations on switches. Specifically, it can add, modify or
delete the flow rules used by any switch to process packets
belonging to f1. We distinguish three types of operations, read-
ily supported by SDN switches. A rule replacement operation
rep(s, f) instructs a switch s to replace all its current rules for
any flow f with the final rule. A tagging operation tag(s, f, θ)
requires switch s to mark packets in flow f with a tag θ. A
matching operation match(s, f, θi, θf ) requests switch s to
install both the initial and final rules for flow f , and apply the
initial (final, resp.) rule to packets tagged as θi (θf , resp.). In
our notation, ∅ is a valid value for any tag, and represents the
absence of a tag. Both rule replacement and tagging operations
modify an existing rule, hence they do not change the number
of installed rules. Conversely, a matching operation involves
adding a new rule, and consumes an additional slot in the
TCAM memory of the corresponding switch. We denote with
app(op) the time at which operation op is applied.
We say that the controller produces a safe update if (i) pack-
ets are guaranteedly delivered to d; and (ii) input policies are
3satisfied throughout the update. In our example, the policy
P(f1) (see left side of Fig. 1) imposes that packets belonging
to f1 must traverse link (v, z) in either of the two directions.
We obviously assume that properties (i) and (ii) hold in the
initial and final states (otherwise no update can be safe).
Update safety depends on the sequence of operations ap-
plied to the switches. In Fig. 1, for instance, if the first
operation is replacing the rule on z, i.e., rep(z, f1), then
packets for flow f1 are trapped in a permanent loop between
v (that applies its initial rule) and z (that applies its final rule)
after app(rep(z, f1)). The loop persists until app(rep(v, f1)).
Instead, if rep(u, f1) is the first operation, then f1 is forwarded
over path [s, u, z, w, d], hence violating the policy P(f1).
A. Previous approaches have limitations
To achieve safe updates, prior work either relies on ordered
replacements or on two-phase commit. The former approach
consists in computing a proper sequence of rule replacements,
when it exists (see, e.g., [18], [20]). The latter one works in
two phases: In the first phase, it applies matching operations
on all internal switches (u, v and z in Fig. 1), in the second
phase it applies tagging operations on flow entry points (s in
Fig. 1) so that all switches use final rules (see, e.g., [12], [28]).
Both approaches are limited in applicability or inefficiency,
since they focus either only on rule replacements or exclu-
sively on tagging and matching operations.
Ordered replacement cannot always be applied. Fig. 1
proves that an ordering of rule replacements preserving both
forwarding correctness and given policies (P (f1) in this case)
does not always exist. Consider possible orderings of rule
replacements at u, v, and z. We have three cases. If we start
from u and rep(u, f1) is the first operation to be applied
by the controller, then f1 is forwarded on path [s, u, z, w, d]
upon app(rep(u, f1)), which immediately violates P(f1). If
we start from v, then f1 is forwarded on path [s, u, v, w, d]
upon app(rep(v, f1)), which also violates P(f1). Finally, if
rep(z, f1) is the first operation, packets of f1 are trapped in
a permanent loop between v and z.
Simultaneous operations are not robust to unpredictable
delays. One may be tempted to impose that some rules
are replaced simultaneously [23], for example on u, v and
z. Unfortunately, it is practically impossible to ensure that
those replacements are actually executed at the same time on
the respective switches. For example, z may be slower (by
seconds [10]) than u to replace its initial rule with its final
one, which would lead to the violation of P(f1). Further, v
can keep using its initial rules for an undefined time, e.g.,
because of a lost message in the communication between the
controller and v itself: This would trigger the loop between v
and z (potentially, even after the previous policy violation).
Hence, simultaneous operations provide no guarantees on
update safety in practice. On the contrary, they can cause all
the forwarding and policy violations (potentially, one after the
other) raised by unsafe rule-replacement orderings.
Two-phase commit techniques are inefficient. They are
based on applying tagging and matching operations on internal
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Fig. 2. FLIP operational sequence for the scenario in Fig. 1: The overhead
is only one additional rule (due to matching operation on z) versus the three
additional rules needed by two-phase commit techniques like [28].
switches in the network. This comes with two possible
consequences. First, the technique is not applicable if there
are switches (say u) that cannot accept additional rules – e.g.,
if their memory is fully used by rules generated (possibly at
runtime) for (i) dynamic load-balancing and fine-grained traffic
engineering [11], (ii) detailed monitoring and troubleshooting
for security tasks [25], or (iii) fast failure reaction through pre-
provisioned backup rules [27]. Second, even if the technique
is applicable, it can require an unnecessarily high number of
additional rules, consuming memory resources on the switches
and potentially inhibiting other applications as dynamic traffic
engineering or fine-grained monitoring during the update.
B. Combining operations is more powerful
The key intuition exploited by our algorithm, FLIP, is that
we can profitably combine rule replacement, tagging and
matching operations. To this end, we build upon properties
that hold if given operations are applied in a certain order. In
Fig. 1, for instance, matching on z ensures that the (v, z) link
is traversed at least once, while tagging on v with z matching
v’s tags ensures that packets exit the potential loop between v
and z after traversing z at most twice. From those guarantees,
we can compute a safe update (e.g., with v tagging and z
matching v’s tags throughout the process).
The exact operational sequence computed by FLIP on the
scenario in Fig. 1 is reported at the top of Fig. 2. It consists of
a sequence of update steps, so that operations in one step have
to be applied after those in the previous step. This means that
the controller must start the operations in a step only after it
is sure that all the operations in the previous step are applied
(e.g., after receiving an acknowledgment from switches [13]).
Operations in the same step can be sent simultaneously to
the switches. This does not mean that they are executed
simultaneously, rather that their relative order does not matter.
FLIP admits correct paths impossible in other approaches.
The bottom part of Fig. 2 provides an illustration of the paths
followed by packets of f1 in any possible state derived from
the application of the FLIP sequence. It visually proves that
both packet delivery and policy compliance (i.e., traversal of
the link between v and z) are guaranteed. Indeed, packets
either follow the initial paths (see Fig. 2(a)), are forwarded
over final paths (see Fig. 2(c)), or traverse link (v, z) in both
directions before exiting the loop between v and z after one
lap (see Fig. 2(b)). Note that the intermediate state in Fig. 2(b)
4can only be setup by conveniently interleaving rule replace-
ments and additions, hence it is structurally impossible for
both ordered replacement and two-phase commit techniques
(including those relying on time-based tags like [24]).
This ability of installing additional paths leads to the fol-
lowing key benefits with respect to previous approaches.
FLIP can carry out updates that are not supported by any
previous technique. For example, if the memory of u is fully
used, Fig. 1 shows a scenario solved by FLIP, while neither
ordered replacement nor two-phase commit techniques can be
used (see discussion in §II-A). Contrary to time-dependent
techniques [23], FLIP updates are robust to unpredictable
delays in message delivery and operation application. The
controller only has to check that all the operations in one
step have been correctly applied before starting the next step.
Indeed, operations in each single step can be applied safely
irrespective of their relative order.
FLIP is more efficient than two-phase commit. Consider
again the example in Fig. 1. FLIP’s overhead is a single
additional rule on z. This overhead is much less than the one
of two-phase commit techniques, as the latter ones (when they
can be used) would install additional rules on u, v, and z.
One may argue that two-phase commit techniques have been
introduced to support strong consistency [6], i.e., to guarantee
that only the initial or the final paths are used throughout an
update, for every flow. Not only does FLIP support strong
consistency too, but it also uses fewer rules than two-phase
commit techniques to provide such support. In Fig. 1, for
instance, FLIP adds rules only on v and z. Indeed, packets
in f1 are forwarded on either the initial or the final path if v
and z apply the initial or final rule consistently with u. FLIP
ensures this property by (i) instructing u to add a tag θf when
it uses its final rule, and (ii) forcing v and z to apply their
final rules when matching θf .
FLIP’s gains tend to be even bigger with a higher number
of flows to update. Table I details how previous techniques
and FLIP perform when u has a limited number of free
memory slots and rules for N flows have to be updated as
in Fig. 1.
Ordered replacement techniques are still not applicable.
The original two-phase commit algorithm [28] cannot handle
updates unless u has at least N free slots. In that case, it
completes the update in only 3 steps (i.e., installing matching
rules on internal switches, instructing border switches to tag
packets, and removing old rules). However, it is even more
memory inefficient than in the single-flow case: It consumes
exactly N entries on u, v and z, for a total of 3N rules
versus the N rules added by FLIP (e.g., on z only). A
workaround [12] to support safe updates of multiple flows
when u has X<N free slots is to shard the update in rounds, so
that at most X flows are updated in each round. This dilutes the
memory overhead over time: the total number of rules added
during the update remains 3N, but each round adds only a
fraction of them (at most 3X). Such workaround, however,
has a detrimental impact on the speed of the update: Each
round is performed in 3 steps (as for the original two-phase
Free memory slots on u
N/100 N/10 N
ordered replacement - - -
two-phase commit (base)
- update steps
- -
3
- estimated update time*
- -
seconds
- total number of added rules 3N
two-phase commit (progressive)
- update steps 300 30 3
- estimated update time* tens of minutes minutes seconds
- total number of added rules 3N 3N 3N
FLIP (this paper)
- update steps 5 5 5
- estimated update time* seconds seconds seconds
- total number of added rules N N N
* based on performance of current SDN switches (e.g., see [10])
TABLE I
FEATURES OF UPDATES COMPUTED BY DIFFERENT TECHNIQUES, WHEN
PATHS FOR N ≥ 100 FLOWS HAVE TO BE CHANGED AS IN FIG. 1.
commit algorithm), with each step realistically taking order of
seconds. Indeed, to complete any update step, environmental
factors (like propagation delay between the SDN controller and
switches, rule installation, reception of acknowledgements,
and error recovery) can easily account for hundreds of mil-
liseconds in a geographically-distributed network. Even more
importantly, recent works (e.g., [10], [35]) have shown that any
current OpenFlow device can take a few seconds to install
a hundred rules. As a final result, sharding an update in a
few tens (hundreds, resp.) steps increases the update time
from order of seconds to order of minutes (hours, resp.). By
reducing the number of added rules, FLIP achieves a superior
memory-time trade-off (e.g., see Table I).
Table I remains exactly the same if v or z are also memory
constrained: In the first case, FLIP would still compute the
sequence shown in Fig. 2; in the latter case, it would compute
a symmetric update sequence where z tags and v matches.
We finally note that the percentage of rule saved by FLIP
with respect to two-phase techniques is much higher in our
experiments (90-98%) than the one shown in the table (66%).
III. SYSTEMATICALLY COMBINING RULE
REPLACEMENTS AND ADDITIONS
Fig. 3 overviews FLIP. We now describe FLIP’s input
(§III-A), output (§III-B), and algorithmic core (§III-C). Since
we publicly released our FLIP implementation [31], we omit
its formalization (i.e., pseudo-code) and provide a plain-text
description. We use the terms switch and node interchangeably.
A. FLIP Input
FLIP takes as input an update problem, which is defined by
the pair of initial and final states, and the properties that have
to preserved during the update.
Initial and final states are defined by per-flow rules used by
switches before and after the update, respectively. We consider
the concept of flow in its broadest sense, as the collection of all
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packets whose headers match a specific bitmask consistently
across switches. In Fig. 1, all switches match packets based on
a bitmask that captures the source address s and the destination
address d; hence, packets sourced at s and destined to d
belong to the same flow f1. Each flow is associated to a
destination to which packets have to be delivered and a set of
sources, e.g., switches attached to the origin of the packets. We
define the forwarding paths for a flow f as the network paths
[s0, s1, s2, . . . , d], where s0 is a source, each si is a switch,
and d is the destination. We admit multiple forwarding paths
(e.g., equal-cost multipath, ECMP), between a source and a
destination for the same flow.
Properties to be guaranteed include forwarding correctness
and preservation of input policies.
Forwarding correctness means that every packet is deliv-
ered to the destination. Even assuming that the initial and
final states are forwarding correct, two types of incorrectness
can be triggered in intermediate states, installed during the
update: blackholes and evil loops. A blackhole occurs when a
forwarding path [s, . . . , b] terminates in a switch b, different
from the destination and without a rule to forward the packet
further. An evil loop occurs when packets of a given flow are
bounced back and forth indefinitely, among a finite number of
switches. In other words, evil loops make a forwarding path
infinite. Note that the loop in Fig. 2(b) is not evil since the
forwarding path used for f1, i.e., [s, u, z, v, z, w, d], is finite.
In the following we use the term loop to indicate an evil loop
occurring during the update, unless otherwise specified.
Policy preservation means that a set of input policies,
satisfied in both the initial and final states, are not violated
in any intermediate state. With respect to previous works
that either support strong consistency [10], [28] or single-
node traversal [18], FLIP can preserve a larger variety of
practical policies. Policies supported by FLIP include traver-
sal of single nodes or links (e.g., for firewalling [28]), but
also of sub-paths (e.g., for distributed middleboxing [26],
service chaining [8] or QoS-based traffic engineering [1]).
Generalizing the notation in Fig. 1, we define a policy as a
set of non-empty paths, called policy paths. An input policy
P({f1, . . . , fk}) = [P1, . . . , Pm], with k,m ≥ 1, imposes
that every forwarding path of any flow fi, with i = 1, . . . , k,
includes at least one of the policy paths P1, . . . , Pm. If this
condition holds, we say that the policy is satisfied; otherwise,
we say that it is violated. We assume that only one policy is
defined for any flow. This, however, does not prevent us from
forcing the same flow through multiple sub-paths (e.g., for
service chaining). For example, if a given flow has to traverse
both sub-paths P1 and P2, we can express this requirement
with a single policy including all paths P1QiP2, where Qi is
a path between P1 and P2.
B. FLIP Output
FLIP returns a partial order between operations. This par-
tial order represents an operational sequence, including rule
replacement, tagging and matching operations. A returned
sequence [G1, . . . , Gn] is such that (i) every Gi, with i =
1, . . . , n, is a group of operations; (ii) operations in each group
Gi guarantee preservation of forwarding correctness and input
policies independently of the relative order in which they are
actually applied by switches (i.e., they can be sent by the
controller in any order or in parallel); and (iii) no operation
of a group Gi+1 should be executed before any operation in
Gi. We refer to any group Gj as j-th update step.
The above properties of FLIP sequences guarantee maxi-
mum robustness to uncontrollable factors: The resulting up-
dates are indeed safe even if any message between the con-
troller and switches is subject to an arbitrary large but finite
delay (e.g., they will be retransmitted if lost), and any switch
takes a non-deterministic time [10] to apply an operation after
receiving the corresponding message from the controller. This
is because all intermediate states are safe irrespectively of the
execution order of operations in the same step – see property
(ii). Hence, the controller can always pause the update for an
arbitrary amount of time, or even roll-back to a previous state
(undoing all the operations in the current update step).
C. Algorithmic Overview
At a high-level, FLIP adopts a divide-and-conquer approach
(see top of Fig. 3). It divides the input update problem into
sub-problems, one per impacted flow. For every sub-problem,
FLIP independently computes a sequence. Per-flow sequences
are finally merged into the output operational sequence.
Problem decomposition and solution composition are easy.
Flows are by definition independent of each other, so we
decompose the problem by simply considering one flow at
a time. For the same reason, per-flow sequences can be
arbitrarily merged without impacting forwarding correctness
and policy preservation. FLIP relies on a simple yet generic
strategy in which per-flow sequences are merged on a per-
step basis. Starting from a set of per-flow sequences, FLIP
computes the i-th step of the final operational sequence as
the union of the i-th step of all per-flow sequences with at
least i steps. This implies that the final sequence is as long
as the longest per-flow sequence. Note that more sophisticated
merging strategies are possible. For example, we could treat
each per-flow sequences as a set of dependencies and use a
scheduling algorithm in [10] to optimize the update speed.
Computation of policy-preserving per-flow sequences is the
most novel part of FLIP. It is based on two core procedures,
which are detailed in the following two sections (§IV-V).
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flow problem and performs two tasks.
First, for each possible forwarding incorrectness or policy
violation, the procedure identifies the constraints that (if sat-
isfied) ensure a safe update. We distinguish between replace-
ment and tag-and-match constraints. A replacement constraint
imposes a certain ordering between rule replacements. A tag-
and-match constraint forces some switches to tag packets
consistently with the applied rule (initial or final), and other
switches to match those tags. For example, to avoid the loop
between v and z in Fig. 1, the replacement constraint generated
by FLIP is app(rep(v, f1)) < app(rep(z, f1)). The tag-and-
match constraint for the same loop imposes that v tags and z
matches until all the switches use their final rules. To setup
packet tagging and tag matching, the latter constraint requires
that tag(v, f1, τ) andmatch(z, f1, τ, ∅) are respectively in G1
and G2, i.e., the first and second update steps. Also, to force
z to match throughout the update, the constraint mandates
app(rep(z, f1)) > app(rep(n, f1)) for any switch n 6= z.
Second, the constraint extraction procedure infers relation-
ships between constraints. Namely, it pinpoints alternative and
dependent constraints. A set of constraints A is alternative to
another set of constraints B if satisfying A prevents all the
potential correctness violations that would be prevented by
satisfying B. For example, applying a rule replacement on v
before z, applying a matching operation on z (with v tagging),
and applying a matching operation on v (while z tags) are all
alternative constraints to avoid the evil loop between z and
v in Fig. 1. In contrast, one constraint c1 depends on another
constraint c2 if every time we want to impose c1 we must also
impose c2. We will discuss dependencies in more detail in §V.
After having extracted constraints, FLIP selects all rule
replacement constraints and marks them as active. FLIP then
translates the set of active constraints into a linear program
(LP) where the objective function is to minimize the number
of update steps. FLIP tries to solve this LP with standard
optimization algorithms. If a solution can be found, FLIP out-
puts the corresponding operational sequence. Otherwise, FLIP
applies the constraint swapping procedure to replace some
active constraints with alternative ones and their dependencies.
Whenever a rule can be added to all switches, matching con-
straints are always satisfiable, hence FLIP eventually reaches
a combination of active constraints for which a solution exists.
IV. FLIP CONSTRAINT EXTRACTION
We now describe the constraint extraction procedure, using
Fig. 4 for illustration.
We start by defining the concept of crucial predecessors,
which is used in the entire procedure. Intuitively, crucial
predecessors of node n are those predecessors of n that
can interrupt an initial or final forwarding path traversing n,
depending on whether they are updated or not. More precisely,
given a node n, a flow f , and a state σ which is either the
initial state or the final state, i.e., σ ∈ {init, fin}, we define
crucial predecessors of n for f in σ a set C of nodes such
that for every forwarding path Q = [s . . . n . . . d] in σ, Q
can be written as [s . . . p,m . . . n . . . d], with possibly m = n,
w
v z
d state: initial final
e c b a
g lh
P(f2) = [[a, b, c, e], [a, b, h, c, z, w], [l, g, h]]policies:
LEGEND:
Fig. 4. Update scenario used to illustrate FLIP constraint extraction.
p ∈ C, possibly p = s, and m next-hop of p only in σ (but
not in {init, fin} \ {σ}). Crucial predecessors are initial if
σ = init, and final otherwise. In Fig. 4, a set of initial crucial
predecessors of w for the considered flow f2 is {z}. Indeed,
initial source-destination paths [x . . . w, d], with x ∈ {l, a},
can all be rewritten as [x . . . z, w, d] and w is not the next-
hop of z in the final state. A node can have multiple sets
of crucial predecessors. For example, {z} and {c} are two
distinct sets of initial crucial predecessors of w for f2 in Fig. 4.
Whenever this case holds, we always consider a specific set of
crucial predecessors which we denote as cpreds(n, f, σ). This
set has the additional property that for every forwarding path
Q = [s . . . p . . . n . . . d], with p ∈ cpreds(n, f, σ), every node
in the sub-path of Q from p to n (if any) uses the same next-
hop in both the initial and the final states for f . As a result,
cpreds(w, f2, init) = {z} in Fig. 4, because the subpath from
z to w does not contain any intermediate node. On the other
hand, the subpath from c to w contains z and z has different
next-hops in the initial and final state. FLIP computes crucial
predecessors with a single backward visit (from n to flow
sources) of the graph associated to σ.
We also denote the graphs corresponding to the initial and
final state for a flow f respectively as Gif and G
t
f .
A. Forwarding correctness constraints
A blackhole is defined as the absence of rules for a flow
f on a switch b traversed by a forwarding path. Given that
the initial and final states are forwarding correct, blackholes
can occur during an SDN update if and only if (i) b has
no rule for f in either the initial or final state, and (ii) in
an intermediate state, a forwarding path for f traverses b
while it has no rule for f . Following this observation, for
each node b with no rule for a flow f in the state SB ∈
{init, fin} but with a rule only in S˜B = {init, fin} \ SB ,
we generate a replacement constraints of the form ∀p ∈
cpreds(b, f, S˜B) app(rep(b, f)) < app(rep(p, f)) if SB =
init and app(rep(b, f)) > app(rep(p, f)) otherwise. This
ensures that (i) if b has no rule before the update (SB = init),
it is ready to apply its final rule when any of its final crucial
predecessors has installed its final rule, hence whenever a
forwarding path can cross b; and (ii) if b has no rule after
the update (SB = fin), it keeps its initial rule until all its
initial crucial predecessors apply their respective final rules,
and a forwarding path cannot cross b anymore. FLIP generates
7no tag-and-match constraint to avoid blackholes. Indeed, since
switches responsible for blackholes do not have rules in the
initial or final states, matching operations would coincide with
replacement constraints, forcing the application of that single
rule throughout the update.
Extracting constraints to avoid evil loops is also quite
intuitive. Consider any potential evil loop L for flow f , as
obtained by enumerating cycles in the graph Gif ∪ G
t
f . For
replacement constraints, we adopt an approach similar to [30]:
We identify the set Linit of nodes such that their respective
next-hops in L are next-hops in the initial but not in the final
state. Similarly, the set Lfin includes nodes whose next-hop
in L is a final but not initial next-hop for the considered flow.
In Fig. 1, v ∈ Linit since z is an initial but not final next-hop
of v, and z ∈ Lfin for symmetrical reasons. We then generate
a replacement constraint forcing any of the nodes in Linit to
be updated before any of the nodes in Lfin. This has already
been proved to prevent evil loops during the update [30]. Also,
we generalize the intuition used in Fig. 2, and generate tag-
and-match constraints imposing that one node in Linit ∪Lfin
matches tags used by its crucial predecessors. Indeed, since
both the initial and final states are correct, matching on a
single node m in Linit ∪ Lfin provably avoids the evil loop
corresponding to L, since m will force packets out of the loop
after at most one lap in the loop (as in Fig. 2(b)).
B. Policy preservation constraints
Policy-preservation constraints are the trickiest to identify:
No previous work actually provides means to enumerate and
formalize them. Abstractly, for every flow f subject to an
input policy, FLIP separately colors Gif and G
t
f . It then
generates constraints based on those colors. In the following,
we textually explain how constraints are extracted for any flow
f subject to a policy P(f) and why they are semantically
correct. As a reference for explanations, colors assigned by
FLIP for cases in Fig. 1 and 4 are reported in Fig. 5 and 6.
First, we color nodes. Given any graph G such that G = Gif
or G = Gtf , colors are assigned using the following algorithm.
First, FLIP identifies all the nodes not having a rule for f in G,
and colors them as blue. Moreover, by analyzing forwarding
paths for f in G, it assigns the yellow color to nodes that
are not part of any forwarding path (from any source of the
flow) even if they have a rule for f . For instance, in the initial
graph of Fig. 4, e is blue since it has no rule for f , as shown
by Fig. 6; Moreover, v is yellow since it has a rule for f
but it is not traversed by any path from a or l (sources of
the flow) to d. To determine other colors, FLIP removes from
G all the edges part of a satisfied policy path for f (e.g.,
(v, z) in Fig. 5). Since policies must be satisfied by any path
in G, this disconnects G, separating sources and destination
into different connected components. FLIP colors all the nodes
reachable from any source as green, and all the nodes in the
connected component of the destination as white. Consistently,
Fig. 5 shows that FLIP colors s, u and v as green in the initial
graph, and z and w as white. By definition, a node g is green
if and only if all the paths from g to the destination satisfy
P(f). Symmetrically, a node w is white if and only if all the
w
v z
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t
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Fig. 5. Graph coloring performed by FLIP when run on the case in Fig. 1.
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Fig. 6. Graph coloring performed by FLIP when run on the case in Fig. 4.
paths from a source of f to w satisfy P(f). All the nodes in
a connected component that does not include neither sources
nor the destination are colored as cyan. For example, nodes
that are in the middle of a policy path (i.e., excluding the first
and the last ones) used to satisfy P(f) from some sources are
cyan. Fig. 6 shows that g, h, b, c and z are cyan in Gif2 for
the example in Fig. 4.
Second, we extract constraints from colored graphs. From
node-colored graphs, FLIP extracts several sets of constraints
for P(f), according to Table II. In the table, we use expres-
sions as n < cpreds(n, f, S) instead of ∀p ∈ cpreds(n, f, S)
app(rep(n, f)) < app(rep(p, f)) for brevity.
Table II shows that FLIP does not generate constraints for
nodes which are either (i) green in both Gif and G
t
f , or
(ii) white in both Gif and G
t
f . Indeed, those nodes cannot
be responsible for possible policy violations. Consider a node
g which is green in both Gif and G
t
f . By definition of green
node, P(f) has to be satisfied by successors of g in both
the initial and final state, hence updating g cannot create a
violation of P(f). The same applies to any node w which
is white in both Gif and G
t
f , since P(f) has to be satisfied
before reaching w in both the initial and final state.
In contrast, constraints are needed for nodes with different
colors in Gif and G
t
f . Consider, for example, any node r which
is white in Gif and green in G
t
f , like z in Fig. 5. A rule
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n>cpreds(n,f,Gt
f
) n>cpreds(n,f,Gt
f
)
match on n match on n
cyan
n<cpreds(n,f,Gi
f
)
enum
n>cpreds(n,f,Gt
f
)
match on n match on n
white, n<cpreds(n,f,Gi
f
) n<cpreds(n,f,Gi
f
)
-
yellow match on n match on n
n=analyzed node, f=flow, Gi
f
=initial state, Gt
f
=final state
TABLE II
FLIP CONSTRAINT EXTRACTION FOR ANY NODE n, WITH INITIAL AND
FINAL COLORS SPECIFIED BY ROWS AND COLUMNS, RESPECTIVELY. NO
CONSTRAINT IS GENERATED IF n IS BLUE IN THE INITIAL OR FINAL STATE.
replacement on r can induce a policy violation from a given
source in Gif : Indeed, the initial policy path can be bypassed
via the final path from the source to r (e.g., [s, u, z]), and
the final policy path can be circumvented with the initial path
from r to the destination (e.g., [z, w]). FLIP constrains the
rule replacement on r to be applied before replacements on
any of its initial crucial predecessors. This guarantees that no
source can reach r with a final path before r uses its final
rule; in turn, this prevents policy paths to be bypassed, as in
the example above. In Fig. 5, FLIP indeed adds a replacement
constraint app(rep(z, f1)) < app(rep(u, f1)). If respected,
this constraint ensures that during the update either (i) u uses
its initial rule, and the initial, policy-compliant path is followed
from u to z; or (ii) u uses its final rule and z uses its own final
rule as well, hence the policy is satisfied after z (since it is
green in the final state). With a similar rationale, we generate
a tag-and-match constraints in which r matches tags added by
its initial and final crucial predecessors.
Similar arguments prove the need for constraints for nodes
with other combinations of (different) colors in Gif and G
t
f .
FLIP only makes one exception, for nodes that are cyan in
both Gif and G
t
f (like b and c in Fig. 6) since they have to be
treated differently. For those nodes, even computing whether
constraints are needed is not obvious, because their presence
in paths violating of P(f) depends on possible next-hops of
both their respective predecessors and successors. Hence, FLIP
enumerates all paths in Gif ∪G
t
f that contain at least one node
which is cyan in both states. This is a sort of limited path
enumeration, which is restricted on the basis of potentially-
dangerous nodes (cyan in both states) belonging to complex
policy paths (with more than two nodes). This enables FLIP
to pinpoint the paths among the enumerated ones that violate
P(f). This way, FLIP detects that [a, b, c, z, w, d] is a possible
forwarding path for f2 which violates P(f2) in Fig. 4. Once a
policy-violating path V is found, FLIP generates a replacement
constraint on a specific node s, such that the sub-path of V
ending in a next-hop of s is not included in any policy path for
the considered flow. In Fig. 4, c is the constrained switch for
V = [a, b, c, z, w, d], since [a, b, c, z] is not included in any
policy path in P(f2). In particular, FLIP constrains c’s rule
replacement to be applied before its crucial predecessor on V ,
i.e., b in this case. With a similar rationale, FLIP also adds a
tag-and-match constraint in which the same switch used for
the replacement constraint (c in our example) matches and all
its crucial predecessors in both Gif and G
t
f tag.
C. Tracking relationships between constraints
FLIP also identifies alternative and dependent constraints.
FLIP stores constraints generated by the same potential
violation as alternative. This generalizes the intuition used in
§II to produce the operational sequence shown in Fig. 2. In the
generation of that sequence, a key observation is that the evil
loop between v and z can be broken by either (i) replacing v’s
rule before replacing z’s one, (ii) tagging on v and matching
on z, or (iii) tagging on z and matching on v. Consistently,
FLIP records those constraints as alternative. More generally,
FLIP stores as alternative all the set of constraints generated
for the same blackhole, evil loop or policy violation.
FLIP tracks dependencies between constraints. Such depen-
dencies are needed to guarantee that a tag τ is not overwritten
or removed before reaching the node which has to match τ –
an implicit assumption behind tag-and-match constraints.
To avoid harmful tag overwriting, FLIP creates a depen-
dency between the original tag-and-match constraint and a
tag-and-match constraint involving the node that can incor-
rectly modify the tag. More precisely, whenever a tag may
traverse a node n that can overwrite it before reaching all its
corresponding matching nodes, FLIP introduces a constraint
dependency to impose that n matches and preserves the tag.
Tags can be potentially overwritten en route in two cases.
The first case is represented by nodes that are critical to
prevent both a loop L and a violation of a policy P . For
example, consider again Fig. 1, and assume that we need to
preserve strong consistency, i.e., ensure that either the initial
path [s, u, v, z, w] or the final one [s, u, z, v, w] is followed.
A tag-and-match constraint in which v tags and z matches
avoids the evil loop between v and z. However, the tag set by
v (to exit the evil loop) may overwrite the one set by u (to
enforce strong consistency). This is exactly what happens in
Fig. 2(b): In that case, however, the tag set by u was intended
to enforce the policy subpath [z, v], hence to be propagated up
to v. In contrast, overwriting the tag at v would disrupt strong
consistency, as the latter requires that all nodes consistently
match the tag set by u until the destination is reached. Hence,
FLIP stores the tag-and-match constraint with v matching as
dependent on the tag-and-match constraint where z matches.
More complex scenarios involving nodes cyan in both the
initial and final states are identified during the enum procedure
in the extraction of policy constraints (see Table II).
The second case where dependencies are needed is repre-
sented by nodes participating in nested evil loops. Consider
Fig. 7. There are two nested evil loops here: [a, b, c, e, a] and
[a, b, e, a]. When FLIP extracts the tag-and-match constraint
where e matches, it also detects that the tags may be overwrit-
ten. Indeed, both b and c are crucial predecessors of e, hence
they are selected as taggers. However, because of their relative
position in the sub-path [a, b, c, e], c could override a tag set
by b. To avoid such an overwriting, FLIP introduces constraint
dependencies that force tags to be propagated throughout
any loop. In the example of Fig. 7, FLIP therefore creates
a dependency between the tag-and-match constraint where e
matches and those where b and c match.
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Fig. 7. Example of a topology where dependencies are needed.
V. FLIP CONSTRAINT SWAPPING
Starting from a set of active constraints, this procedure
swaps an active constraint with one of its alternatives. Select-
ing the constraints to swap can be done in different ways. FLIP
uses a heuristic approach that efficiently finds a safe sequence
with few matching operations, to limit the memory overhead.
This heuristic does not guarantee to find an update sequence
with the minimum number of extra rules – which remains
an open research problem. Nevertheless, it shows very good
performance in practice (see §VI). Details follow on how
FLIP constraint swapping ensures efficiency and correctness.
FLIP always swaps replacement constraints with tag-and-
match ones, never the opposite. This means that replacement
constraints are never added back, i.e., swapping a replacement
constraint translates into permanently discarding it. This strat-
egy is guaranteed to eventually converge because all matching
constraints are set as active in an extreme case. Also, it implies
that FLIP falls back to the two-phase commit approach [28]
in the worst case.
FLIP selects constraints to be swapped so that it quickly
finds a solvable set of constraints. Indeed, at each invocation
of the constraint swapping procedure, FLIP selects a pair of
constraints (R,M), where R is the replacement constraint
to be swapped with the M tag-and-match one, in such a
way that (i) R is in an Irreducible Infeasible Set [5] of the
active constraints, i.e., a minimal set of active constraints that
cannot be satisfied simultaneously; and (ii)M has the minimal
number of dependent constraints among the alternatives for R.
FLIP preserves the semantics of all constraints after any
swap. After having selected the pair of constraints (R,M) to
be swapped, FLIP updates all active constraints to take into
account the effect of the swap. This involves multiple actions.
First, any replacement constraint R′ with M as an alter-
native is removed from the active constraints. Indeed, the
potential anomalies that R′ avoids are now prevented by M .
Second, FLIP adds all M ’s dependencies to the set of
active constraints, i.e., respecting the meaning itself of such
dependencies. This also implies removing other replacement
constraints having one of M ’s dependencies as alternatives.
Note that the need for setting dependent constraints as active
intuitively justify our selection heuristic that selects the alter-
native to R with a minimal number of dependencies.
Third, FLIP rewrites replacement constraints (if any) in-
volving the switch r which matches in M . More precisely,
each replacement constraint app(rep(x, f)) < app(rep(r, f)),
w
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Fig. 8. Example where a constraint swap requires rewriting of a replacement
constraint.
where x is a switch different from r, is replaced by a set of
constraints app(rep(x, f)) < app(rep(y, f)), one for every
crucial predecessor y of r. This is needed to preserve the
semantics of the original constraint, that is, to prevent r from
using its final rule if x was still using its initial one. Since r
uses either its initial or final rule depending on packet tags, the
new constraints indeed impose that the final rule is installed on
x before y installs its final rule (and adds final tags), therefore
indirectly forcing r to use its final rule too. We apply a similar
rewriting for constraints app(rep(x, f)) > app(rep(r, f)).
Fig. 8 exemplifies a constraint rewriting performed by FLIP
and illustrates why it is necessary. The input policy is meant
to enforce strong consistency (only the initial or final paths
are acceptable). For s1 to use its final path upon its rule
replacement, we would need constraints app(rep(b, f4)) <
app(rep(e, f4)) and app(rep(e, f4)) < app(rep(s1, f4)) to
be satisfied. Also, for s1 to keep using the initial path before
its rule is replaced, app(rep(s1, f4)) < app(rep(b, f4)) must
hold. This implies that a safe update cannot carried out
with rule replacement only. Thus, FLIP swaps one of those
replacement constraints with an alternative tag-and-match one.
Assume that FLIP selects app(rep(e, f4)) < app(rep(s1, f4))
as the constraint to be swapped: Its alternative is to tag on
s1 and match on e. Now, the rule applied by e depends on
the tag set by s1. Hence, FLIP rewrites app(rep(b, f4)) <
app(rep(e, f4)) as app(rep(b, f4)) < app(rep(s1, f4)). Such
a rewriting is fundamental to maintain correctness, i.e., to keep
the property that s1 uses its final path upon its rule is replaced.
Indeed, without rule rewriting, we would have left with
replacement constraints app(rep(b, f4)) < app(rep(e, f4))
and app(rep(s1, f4)) < app(rep(b, f4)): According to those
constraints, we could have started with a rule replacement at
s1, which however would have installed path [s1, e, b, c, w, d]
(since e matches the final tag set by s1) and violated the
input policy P4. In contrast, the rule rewriting leaves FLIP
with constraints app(rep(b, f4)) < app(rep(s1, f4)) and
app(rep(s1, f4)) < app(rep(b, f4)), which are still unsat-
isfiable and for which we need another constraint swap.
Eventually, FLIP finds a safe sequence based on matching on
both e and b and tagging on s1.
A complete illustration of how constraint swapping works
for the case in Fig. 1 is reported in Fig. 9. This constraint
swap leads to the solution displayed in Fig. 2. In the figure,
the first set of constraints (top left of the figure) is the one
extracted by FLIP from the original update problem. Initially,
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Fig. 9. A constraint swapping solving the scenario in Fig. 1.
all and only replacement constraints are active. FLIP translates
active constraints into the linear program (LP) shown at the
top right of Fig. 9, where rx stands for app(rep(x, f1)),
with x ∈ {u, v, z}. Such an LP has no solutions. The swap-
ping procedure selects app(rep(v, f1)) < app(rep(z, f1))
as constraint to be swapped, since it is in the set of con-
tradictory constraints. Hence, it updates the set of active
constraints by removing the constraint to be swapped and
adding one of its alternatives, namely match on z. Further,
app(rep(z, f1)) < app(rep(u, f1)) is also removed from the
active constraints, since match on z was an alternative to
it. No other constraint is added or modified because match
on z does not have dependencies and z is not involved in
any other replacement constraint. The LP deriving from the
new set of active constraints is shown in the bottom right
part of the figure. In this LP, rz > ru, rv, rw derives from
the formalization of the match-and-tag constraints on z, as
discussed in §III-C. Note that match on z also implies other
constraints, imposing that tag(v, f1, τ) and match(z, f1, τ, ∅)
must be in the first two update steps. Since they do not impose
constraints on any other operation, FLIP does not include the
latter constraints into the LP but accommodate them by post-
processing the LP solution, i.e., adding those operations to the
very first steps of the returned sequence.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluate FLIP by performing 50, 000 experiments. In
each experiment, we generate an update problem; on each
problem, we run our FLIP implementation, which is available
at http://inl.info.ucl.ac.be/softwares/flip. We verify that the op-
erational sequence computed by FLIP is correct by simulating
its application to the corresponding network. To this end,
we apply one operation at the time, following the sequence
generated by FLIP, and we check forwarding correctness and
policy preservation after each operation. For efficiency reason,
we apply operations in the same step in a random order
rather than simulating all possible permutations. While this can
theoretically lead to false positives (i.e., sequences accidentally
considered correct), the sheer number of experiments provides
statistical confidence on the absence of false positives. We
focus on single-flow updates, since FLIP works on a per-flow
basis (see Fig. 3).
A. Setup
As dataset, we use all the publicly available Rocketfuel
topologies [29], denoted by their identifiers (1221, 1239, 1755,
3257, 3967, 6461) in the following. Their sizes range from 79
nodes and 294 edges to more than 300 nodes and almost 2,000
edges. For each topology, we select uniformly at random a
node as destination, and a random 10% of the nodes as sources.
All the equal-cost (ECMP) shortest paths from any source to
the destination in the original topology are taken as the initial
state. Further, we randomly pick 80% of the links and set
their weight to a value chosen uniformly at random among
the weights of the original topology (possibly its initial one).
The ECMP shortest paths from the sources to the destination
in this reweighted graph are taken as the final state.
This methodology provides qualitatively diverse update sce-
narios. Depending on the selected links and new weights,
reweighting links at random statistically tends to generate
(i) cases where only a few paths change, (ii) major routing
modifications where most nodes change next-hop, and (iii)
intermediate scenarios between those two extremes. Table III
shows that this is indeed the case in our experiments: In half of
them, the nodes changing next-hop are roughly between 60%
(first quartile) and 45% (third quartile), although only 20% of
them need to be updated in 5% of the experiments.
experiments
5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
(percentile)
next-hop
66.67% 59.42% 50.63% 45.34% 20.19%
changes
TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF NODES CHANGING NEXT-HOPS IN OUR EXPERIMENTS
Finally, we add random policies so that every path from a
source to the destination complies with at least one policy.
We choose non-trivial policies composed of paths longer than
2 nodes, which also shows FLIP’s support for more complex
policies than single-node traversal ones considered by [18].
B. Results
The results of our experiments are summarized in Fig. 10-
11. We now discuss those results in more details.
FLIP always computes safe updates. It prevents any possible
blackhole, evil loop or policy violation in each and every ex-
periment. FLIP’s 100% success rate marks an important differ-
ence with previous ordered replacement techniques, like [20],
that preserve policies by ensuring strong consistency, i.e.,
using either the initial or the final paths for each flow. We run
an exhaustive search approach to compute the number of cases
in which strong consistency can be guaranteed by ordered rule
replacements. Results are displayed in Fig. 10(a). They show
that ordered replacement techniques cannot find an operational
sequence in more than ≈ 25% of our experiments. Even worse,
their success rate greatly depends on the specific topology,
and larger topologies (e.g., 1239) are virtually impossible to
tackle. In contrast, FLIP finds a safe sequence in all our
update scenarios. This is because FLIP explores a much larger
solution space, including operational sequences tailored to
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Fig. 10. FLIP outperforms previous approaches in our 50,000 experiments on Rocketfuel topologies.
guarantee the input policy (rather than strong consistency)
and combining rule replacements with tagging-and-matching
operations (rather than restricting to the former ones).
FLIP hugely reduces the number of added rules. In the
99.9th percentile of the experiments, FLIP adds one rule to
8.7% of the nodes. We now compare FLIP’s overhead with the
one of two-phase commit techniques. For each experiment, we
compute the number NDUP of additional rules added by [28],
and the number NFLIP of additional rules added by FLIP. To
be fair, we assume that the two-phase commit approach does
not match on nodes with the same next-hops in the initial
and final states, as also suggested in [28]. We then calculate
the percentage of rules saved by FLIP as NDUP−NFLIP
NDUP
×
100. This percentage expresses the relative comparison of
the overhead induced by FLIP and two-phase commit, with a
metric normalized with respect to topology sizes.
Fig. 10(b) shows the Cumulative CDF of such percentage in
our experiments. A data point (x, y) in the plot indicates that
for a fraction y of the experiments, FLIP saves at least x% of
the rules that would be used by [28]. Across all topologies,
in 98% of the experiments (y = 0.98) FLIP saves at least
94% (x = 94) of the rules added by [28]. Across all our
experiments, at least 87.8% of the rules are saved by FLIP.
Note that FLIP’s savings are fundamentally different from
those of previous variants of two-phase commit techniques.
Prominently, [12] proposes to reduce the update overhead
by updating groups of flows in different rounds. In contrast
to FLIP, this workaround does not avoid rule additions, but
only distributes them over time (e.g., see Table I and the
corresponding discussion). Moreover, [12] degenerates to [28]
in our experiments, since a single flow is updated in them.
FLIP computes fast updates. Fig. 11 shows a CDF of
the number of update steps in our experiments. In all our
experiments, the median number of update steps is 5, the 95th
percentile is 8, and the 99.9th percentile 12. This distribution
does not vary excessively across the different topologies. The
only exception is represented by 1221, the smallest topology,
where FLIP’s sequences have less than 4 steps in 95% of the
experiments. As a comparison, the most generally applicable
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Fig. 11. FLIP sequences are composed of a few steps, a dozen at most.
two-phase commit technique [12] computes updates with 3
steps per round, where each round updates a subset of the flows
(see Table I and its discussion). The number of rounds (hence,
of steps) is determined by the additional memory available at
the most constrained switch involved in the update. If 1,000
flows have to be updated and there is at least one switch
involved in the update which cannot accept 1,000 additional
entries, then at least 2 rounds are needed, i.e., 6 steps (already
more than FLIP’s median). If there is at least one switch which
cannot accept 500 entries, then at least three rounds and 9 steps
are needed, and so on.
The small number of update steps in FLIP sequences is
due to the very design of our algorithm. When computing
rule-replacement orderings, FLIP minimizes the sum of the
steps to which rule replacements are assigned (e.g., see the
objective function of the LPs in Fig. 9). This also implies that
FLIP sequences have the same number of steps with respect
to an optimal sequence computed by ordered replacement
techniques, when such a sequence exists. Fig. 10(a) indicates
that this is the case in about 10% of our experiments.
FLIP often terminates in sub-seconds. Fig. 12 shows a CDF
of FLIP running times in our experiments. FLIP’s median
execution time is 0.176 seconds when run on a commodity
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Fig. 12. FLIP execution time is often sub-second.
server (8-core 2.66GHz CPU2 and 16 GB of RAM). Also, 94%
of the instances are solved in less than 1 second, and 99% in
less than 4 seconds. The topology with the worst performance
is 1239, the largest one, where the 95th percentile of the
execution time is 3.38 seconds and the 99th is 15 seconds.
Those results show that FLIP readily supports many up-
date scenarios, from deployment of policy changes to online
traffic engineering (typically performed at the timescale of
few minutes [8]) to pre-computation of failure reaction. Code
optimization and more powerful hardware likely improve FLIP
runtime, and make the algorithm suitable for bigger networks.
Another important observation is that FLIP execution time
does not dominate the overall time of an update. In fact, the
total time to complete an update is the sum of computing the
operational sequence (FLIP execution time, in our case) and
applying such operations in the network. The latter is equal to
the number of update steps (see Fig. 11 for FLIP) multiplied
by the time to apply the operations in each step, which in
turn depends on factors such as network latency, message
processing time at the switches, rule installation time at the
switches, reception of acknowledgements at the controller,
and possibly error recovery and retransmissions (e.g., for lost
messages). Since those factors are network-specific, it is hard
to give a general estimation of the sequence application time;
however, recent studies (e.g., [10], [35]) suggest that it is
realistically in the order of seconds per step (irrespective of
the update technique used to compute the migration plan), that
is, much more than the FLIP execution time.
VII. DISCUSSION
We now discuss FLIP limitations, and possibilities to miti-
gate them through variants of the current algorithm.
Scope. While FLIP is a general algorithm that can be used in
any network setting and update scenario, it may be an over-
sophisticated solution in some cases.
First, FLIP is not necessarily advantageous for specific
subsets of policies. For instance, more specialized and efficient
algorithms [4], [33] have been recently proposed for the
2Our FLIP implementation is single-threaded, but the used LP solver
libraries rely on parallel code
special case of updates solely admitting initial and final paths
for every flow throughout the update (strong consistency).
Second, FLIP provides the most benefits when initial and
final paths for the same flow can differ arbitrarily, as for
generic updates of enterprise, wide area (WAN) or service
provider networks (see §VI). In contrast, initial and final paths
for the same flow tend not to form cycles in data center (DC)
networks, because of the structural regularity of typical DC
topologies (like fat trees [2]). For example, the case depicted
in Fig. 1 is topologically impossible in a fat tree topology. This
tends to make replacement-only techniques always applicable,
and FLIP’s main features (like modeling and swapping of
constraints on rule replacements and additions) unnecessary.
We double-checked the limited benefits of our approach for
DC updates by running FLIP on 100 update scenarios on syn-
thetic fat tree topologies. In our experiments, we significantly
reshuffled paths assigned to traffic flows by reweighting 80%
of the links (randomly extracted), i.e., multiplying the weight
of each of those links by a value randomly extracted among
2, 5, 10, or 25. In all those experiments, FLIP always returned
a sequence with only rule replacements.
Flexibility on update constraints and objectives. A multi-
tude of constraints and objectives may be desirable for real-
world updates. FLIP currently focuses on minimization of the
update sequence, subject to its guaranteed safety.
Nevertheless, by internally relying on LPs, FLIP readily
supports several customizations of update constraints and
objectives. For example, different weights can be assigned to
LP constraints in order to privilege early update of certain
switches over others, e.g., depending on their operational
importance (volumes of carried traffic) or reactivity [10].
FLIP can also be extended to provide additional flexibility.
By tweaking constraint extraction and swapping procedures,
it can be customized to support higher-level preferences on
the returned update sequences. For example, we can forbid
rule additions on specific nodes by never generating matching
constraints on those nodes. Similarly, we can avoid adding
rules to prevent specific policy violations (e.g., enforcing low
latency paths) by never swapping ordering constraints for such
policies with any matching constraint.
Time complexity. FLIP includes sub-functions whose com-
plexity is not polynomial with respect to the size of the input.
In particular, the constraint extraction procedure sometimes
requires to enumerate paths between sets of nodes (see Ta-
ble II). Also, in the swapping phase, FLIP computes minimal
sets of LP constraints that cannot be satisfied together, which
is a computationally hard problem [5].
Our evaluation on Rocketfuel topologies (§VI) shows that
worst-case time complexity tends not to be a problem for rela-
tively sparse topologies like WANs (see Fig. 12). Nevertheless,
potential time inefficiency may become more critical for real-
time updates (e.g., reaction to failures). Also, it can lead to
limited practicality in very dense topologies, like data center
ones (which however are not the settings where FLIP is mostly
useful, see above): While the median execution time has been
91ms in our DC experiments, FLIP constraint extraction took
several minutes in a few cases, because nested loops induced
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many dependencies between loop constraints.
Whenever time efficiency is critical, slight algorithmic vari-
ations (e.g., based on domain knowledge) can improve FLIP
performance. For instance, we can cut down the time needed
to deal with loop-constraint dependencies by discovering
those dependencies at runtime (when a constraint swap is
needed), rather than beforehand. This works especially well
for data-center networks, where constraints are rarely or never
swapped (see above). Additionally, we can trade optimality
and flexibility for shorter execution time. For example, we
could internally replace LPs with dependency graphs, having
one node per rule replacement and one edge per constraint
between replacements. We would then extract a sequence by
using a topological sorting algorithm instead of an LP solver.
The dependency graph model would enable us to replace the
expensive IIS procedure with a polynomial-time visit on the
graph where we check for a single loop. This performance
gain would however come at the cost of (i) potential sub-
optimality of the solution returned by the topological sorting
algorithm, e.g., in terms of sequence length; (ii) less flexibility
with respect to custom constraints and objectives (see previous
discussion); and (iii) impossibility to guarantee that the set of
infeasible constraints is minimal, which may eventually lead to
swap more constraints. A full investigation of those variations
is left for future work.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we studied how to achieve safe, efficient and
robust updates of SDN networks, that preserve both forwarding
correctness and input policies. We unveiled the power of com-
bining rule replacements and additions, demonstrating how
such combinations can overcome the limitations of existing
approaches. Also, we showed how to systematically exploit
this power. We presented FLIP, an algorithm that interleaves
rule replacements and additions to create safe operational
sequences. Our extensive evaluation shows the entity of the
gain achieved by FLIP with respect to previous approaches. In
our WAN experiments, FLIP is 90% more efficient than two-
phase commit techniques in terms of memory overhead, and it
supports 90% more update scenarios than ordered replacement
ones. Our experiments also show that FLIP quickly computes
updates terminating in a very limited number of steps.
The model that FLIP uses to reason about combinations of
rule replacement and additions makes FLIP extensible. For
instance, FLIP can easily support domain-specific constraints
such as memory restrictions on specific switches. We success-
fully tested one of such cases, in which we prevented any
rule addition on a specific switch by manually injecting an
additional constraint to FLIP’s model.
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